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Authors' Note 
 
This paper was initially written during the fall of 2009 and since that 
time, several new versions of Android OS have been available to 
customers via upgrades or new phone purchases. With each new phone 
and firmware update, there are initial challenges to the forensic 
community; the fundamentals of acquiring and analyzing an image, 
however, have remained the same. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 It is hardly appropriate to call the devices many use to 
receive the occasional phone call a telephone any more. The 
capability of these devices is growing, as is the number of 
people utilizing them. By the end of 2009, 46.3% of mobile 
phones in use in the United States were reported to be smart 
phones (AdMob, 2010). 
 With the increased availability of these powerful 
devices, there is also a potential increase for criminals to use 
this technology as well. Criminals could use smart phones for a 
number of activities such as committing fraud over e-mail, 
harassment through text messages, trafficking of child 
pornography, communications related to narcotics, etc. The 
data stored on smart phones could be extremely useful to 
analysts through the course of an investigation. Indeed, mobile 
devices are already showing themselves to have a large volume 
of probative information that is linked to an individual with just 
basic call history, contact, and text message data; smart phones 
contain even more useful information, such as e-mail, browser 
history, and chat logs. Mobile devices probably have more 
probative information that can be linked to an individual per 
byte examined than most computers -- and this data is harder to 
acquire in a forensically proper fashion. 
 Part of the problem lies in the plethora of cell phones 
available today and a general lack of hardware, software, and/or 
interface standardization within the industry. These differences 
range from the media on which data is stored and the file 
system to the operating system and the effectiveness of certain 
tools. Even different model cell phones made by the same 
manufacture may require different data cables and software to 
access the phone's information.  
 The good news is there are numerous people in the 
field working on making smart phone forensics easier. Already 
there is material available on how to conduct an examination on 
Blackberry phones and a growing number of resources about 
the iPhone. However, there is a new smart phone OS on the 
market named Android and it will likely gain in appeal and 
market share over the next year. While Android initially 
launched with only one phone on T-Mobile, phones are now 
available on Sprint, Verizon and AT&T as well. 
 
Introduction to Android 
 
 Android is an operating system (OS) developed by the 
Open Handset Alliance (OHA). The Alliance is a coalition of 
more than 50 mobile technology companies ranging from 
handset manufactures and service providers to semiconductor 
manufacturers and software developers, including Acer, ARM, 
Google, eBay, HTC, Intel, LG Electronics, Qualcomm, Sprint, 
and T-Mobile. The stated goal of the OHA is to "accelerate 
innovation in mobile and offer consumers a richer, less 
expensive, and better mobile experience" (OHA, 2009, n.p.). 
 
 
Figure 1. Android architecture (Android.com, 2009b). 
 
 The basic architecture of Android is shown in Figure 
1. At its core, Android OS builds are based on the Linux 2.6 
kernel. When running on a hard drive, the Linux system device 
defaults to the first physical hard drive, or /dev/hd0. In 
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addition, Linux only understands character and block devices, 
such as keyboards and disk drives, respectively. With Linux on 
flash, however, a Flash Transition layer provides the system 
device functionality. A Memory Technology Device (MTD) is 
needed to provide an interface between the Linux OS and the 
physical flash device because flash memory devices are not 
seen as character or block devices (Dedekind, 2009). 
 The Android Runtime System utilizes the Dalvik 
virtual machine (VM), which allows multiple applications to be 
run concurrently as each application is its own separate VM. 
Android applications (the apps of today's common parlance) 
are compiled into Dalvik executable (.dex) files 
(DalvikVM.com, 2008). During a forensic examination one 
will be mainly concerned with the Libraries and, in particular, 
the SQLite databases. This is where one will find the majority 
of data that could be of interest in an investigation. Files can be 
stored on either the device's storage or on the removable secure 
digital (SD) memory card (Android.com, 2009b). 
 Unlike the typical desktop operating system, data or 
other files created by one Android app cannot automatically be 
viewed by other applications by default. The VM nature of 
Android allows each application to run its own process. 
Security is permissions-based and attached at the process level 
by assigning user and group identifiers to the applications. 
Application cannot interfere with each other without being 
given the explicit permissions to do so (Android.com, 2009a). 
 The security mechanisms of the Android OS could 
impede a forensic examination although some of the basic tools 
and techniques could allow investigators to recover data from 
the device. The first, most obvious step is to perform a 
traditional forensics analysis of the microSD card from the 
phone. This is the least effective method as it can only is access 
the data that apps directly store on the SD card. SD cards use 
the FAT32 file system and are easily imaged and examined 
using traditional forensics tools (including write-blocking 
hardware) (TalkForensics, 2009). 
 The Android file system is Yet Another Flash File 
System 2 (YAFFS2). YAFFS, developed in 2002, was the first 
file system designed for NAND (Not-AND) flash memory 
devices. YAFFS2 was designed in 2004 in response to the 
availability of larger sized NAND flash devices; older chips 
support a 512 byte page size whereas newer NAND memory 
has 2096 byte pages. YAFFS2 is backward compatible with 
YAFFS (Manning, 2002). 
 
Acquiring a Physical Image of an Android Device 
 
 Since Android is still an emerging OS and, forensics is 
in its infancy, this section will explore the steps of the analysis 
of an Android device. The following methods were assembled 
from research done and methods created by the 
android/htcmodding community as well as assistance from 
Andrew Hoog and ViaForensics. 
 
 
Figure 2. Sprint HTC Hero (left) and information screen of test 
device (right). 
 
 As of July 2010, the latest version of Android 
available was v2.2 (Froyo) and v3.0 (Gingerbread) is expected 
before the end of the year. The analysis described below was 
performed during the fall of 2009 on a Sprint HTC Hero 
running Android v1.5 (aka Cupcake) (Figure 2). The Hero is a 
little different than a standard Android phone because HTC 
employs its own Sense user interface (UI) on the device, which 
will not be used on any Google-branded devices (HTC, 2009; 
Miller, 2009). While the Sense UI changes the look and feel of 
the device, it is uncertain how much (if any) this impacts a 
forensic investigation of the HTC Hero. 
 
Connecting the device via a data cable 
 
 Although the data cable for the Hero is a proprietary 
HTC cable (ExtUSB), an ordinary mini-USB cable will work 
for data transfers.  The HTC cable handles running music and 
video over USB and would be desired for consumer 
applications but is not required for any type of forensics 
analysis. 
 
Imaging the memory card 
 
 Although an analysis of the removable memory of the 
phone has its limitation and phone system data is likely not 
stored to the memory card, it can still be a valuable tool. 
Making an image from the phone's memory card is quite simple 
and normal procedures for imaging a device can be used. In the 
analysis here, AccessData's FTK Imager v2.5.1 was employed. 
 The phone first needs to be connected to the 
examination machine using a write blocker to ensure the 
integrity of the data. Once the phone is connected, it will 
prompt that the USB cable is connected and ask the user to 
select to copy files to/from the host computer. Another screen 
then appears asking the user to mount the device (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. "USB Connected" screen. 
 
 Once connected, the device will look for any 
necessary appropriate drivers. If issues arise, drivers are made 
available on HTC's website. 
 
 Now in FTK Imager, go to the File pulldown menu, 
and select the Add Evidence open, and then choose Physical 
Drive. Select the drive that is appropriate to the Android device 
(Figure 4). Note that the device will be the same size as the 
memory card (in this case, there is an 8GB microSD card in the 
device. 
 
 
Figure 4. FTK Imager "Drive Selection" screen. 
 
 Save the image by using the File, Export disk image 
option. Make sure to take a physical image of the entire drive 
rather than a logical image of the partition. In this case, 
\\PHYSICALDRIVE5 was selected and imaged, sending the 
output to a raw dd image file. (The rationale for using dd for 
image files is provided below.) As with any image file, be sure 
to verify the hash prior to any subsequent analysis (Figure 5). 
Note that the SD card should be put aside and not replaced in 
the phone. 
 
 
Figure 5. FTK Imager image summary screen. 
 
Importance of rooting the device in order to obtain a dd 
image 
 
 The ability to physically image memory is the holy 
grail of mobile device forensics. The device's memory can 
contain extremely valuable data, such as: the contact list, call 
logs, text messages, and other phone data. Additional 
information can also be hidden and uncovered, such as Web 
history, e-mails, images viewed on the phone, passwords, and 
fragments of other data. Access to memory can be 
accomplished by rooting the phone. 
 While the term rooting can have a negative 
connotation (similar to jailbreaking an iPhone), it has a 
different meaning than is generally perceived. Rooting a device 
merely means to gain access to the root directory (/) and 
having the appropriate permissions to take root actions. The 
modding community -- i.e., modern day hackers (in the 1970s 
sense of the word) who like to modify devices beyond the 
intentions of the device designers or vendors -- uses the term to 
mean accessing the root directory/permissions and then 
substantially modifying the phone to increase battery life or 
performance, run homebrewed applications, and/or install 
custom firmware on the phone (Purdy, 2009). Obviously, 
changing the data in such a way is not forensically sound and 
would not be done in an investigation. 
 Obtaining a dd image file is possible when the 
permissions are altered to gain access to the root directory. It is 
important to note that this method (at least for the Sprint HTC 
Hero), in its current iteration, needs to have a third party 
program installed on the device in order to get root permissions 
and likely would not be admissible in a court room setting. 
There are different ways to gain root permissions on other 
devices that do not involve adding anything to the phone but 
this is not the case on the Hero. The following method, then, 
should be viewed more of a proof of concept that could be 
tailored to be forensically sound if an alternate way to obtain 
root is found. 
 
USB Debugging 
  
In order to acquire access to the root directory, 
Universal Serial Bus (USB) debugging will have to be enabled 
on the phone. Although the default setting is “disabled,” going 
to Settings, selecting Applications, choosing Development and 
touching the checkbox, can turn on this function.  
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Root access will not be possible if an examiner 
encounters a locked Android device that does not have USB 
debugging enabled. If presented with a locked device, one may 
either attempt the method and hope that USB debugging is 
currently enabled by the user or must defeat the lock screen by 
some other method and then enable debugging using the 
outlined method above. 
 
Preparing the Hero for rooting 
 
 The method described here is based upon descriptions 
at The Unlockr.com (2009) and is the result of the work of 
many users at the XDA Developers forum (forum.xda-
developers.com/). The Android root access software was 
created by Christopher Lais at ZenThought.org. Be sure to 
insert a fresh SD card in the phone (do not replace the original 
SD card in the phone as it contains evidence that this process 
will alter). 
 The first step is to set up the Android Development 
Tools (ADT) on the host Linux, MacOS, or Windows computer 
system. The ADT is part of the Android Software Development 
Kit (SDK) (Android Developers, 2009). For a Windows 
system, download the SDK ZIP file and extract the files to the 
host computer. 
 The next step is to ensure that the phone and the 
Android development bridge (ADB) are both functioning as 
expected. In the Windows command line, move to the 
AndroidSDK folder, navigate to the tools subfolder, and 
run the adb devices command. If everything is working 
properly, a list of attached devices will show up with a 
corresponding serial number (Figure 6). If not presented with a 
list of devices, one must check that drivers are functioning 
properly and that USB debugging is enabled.  
 
 
Figure 6. Starting the Android SDK in Windows. 
 
 The method necessary to obtain root is specific to 
each phone and OS varient. The following method was 
designed for the Sprint HTC Hero running OS version 1.5 and 
utilizes a program called AsRoot2 (ZenThought, 2009). The 
archive needs to be downloaded and the files extracted the files 
to the Tools folder and then execute the following commands 
(Figure 7): 
 
> adb push asroot2 /data/local/ 
> adb shell chmod 0755 
/data/local/asroot2 
> adb shell 
$ /data/local/asroot2 /system/bin/sh 
# mount -o remount,rw -t yaffs2 
/dev/block/mtdblock3 /system 
# cd /system/bin 
# cat sh>su 
# chmod 4755 su 
 
 
Figure 7. Obtaining root access of the Android device in 
Windows. 
 
 If these steps all work correctly, the examiner should 
now have root permissions and can image the Android device. 
It should be noted that there is no real indicator that root access 
is available; to test out if it is functioning properly, continue 
and try to make a dd image of the memory (per the instructions 
below). 
 
Creating a dd image of memory 
 
 The file system of the Android device is stored in a 
few different places within /dev. Without the use of a 
traditional hard drive, the Linux kernel makes use of an MTD 
that allows for the embedded OS running directly on flash (SSI 
Embedded Systems, 2008). Although it may differ for other 
android phones, there are six files of interest located in 
/dev/mtd/ (Android-DLs.com, 2009): 
 
• mtd0 handles miscellaneous tasks 
• mtd1holds a recovery image 
• mtd2 contains the boot partition 
• mtd3 contains system files 
• mtd4 holds cache 
• mtd5 holds user data 
 
 Although it is important to image each file to obtain 
the complete operating system, the majority of this examination 
will focus on the information in mtd3 and mtd5. 
 In order to image memory, the Android SDK shell will 
need to again be launched. As before, navigate to the 
AndroidSDK\tools directory, start the shell by executing 
the adb shell command, and then entering the 
/data/local/asroot2 /system/bin/sh instruction. 
 Once in the shell, the dd command can be used to 
image the memory files, using the command (Hoog, 2009a): 
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dd if=/dev/mtd/mtd0 of=/sdcard/mtd0.dd 
bs=1024 
 
The command above will make a bit-for-bit image of the mtd0 
file, using a block size of 1024 bytes, and copy the image file to 
the SD card. Repeat this command five more times in order to 
image the remaining five files of interest (Figure 8). 
 
 
Figure 8. Obtaining root access of the Android device in 
Windows. 
 
  Note that this command will direct the output to the 
SD card. For this reason, it is imperative that a formatted and 
wiped SD card is placed into the phone and that the evidentiary 
SD card is put aside. It is also extremely important to not mix 
up the input file (if) and output file (of) parameters so as to 
not inadvertently destroy any data. 
 At this point, the dd files can be analyzed using any 
forensics software. Be sure to use a write-blocker when 
accessing the files on the SD card. 
 
Examination of Memory 
 
 The examination of the memory image files was 
performed using Access Data's Forensic Tool Kit (FTK) v1.81. 
FTK was selected because of its data carving and searching 
capabilities; since today's forensic software does not mount the 
YAFFS2 file system, the ability for string searches was 
paramount. 
 When setting up the analysis in FTK, select options 
for full indexing and data carving, and add all six files for 
analysis. In this case, the subject phone was approximately two 
months old and had been used extensively for data applications. 
After data carving, 207 Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) 
and Portable Data Format (PDF) documents were recovered, as 
were 12,709 BitMap (BMP), Graphics Interchange Format 
(GIF), Joint Photographic Experts Group (JPEG), and Portable 
Network Graphics (PNG) images. 
 
Recovered documents 
 
 Most of the recovered documents were not of a real 
evidentiary value. A large portion of the HTML files were 
advertisements and only four files were complete snapshots of 
Web pages (Figure 9, left). The HTML files included 28 
Exchangeable Image File (EXIF) data for JPEGs; this 
information can be helpful to determine what specific camera 
took an image.  
 
 
Figure 9. Recovered files: Web page (left) and Google search 
history (right). 
 
 One particularly interesting document that contained 
useful information was the single recovered PDF file. This file 
was extremely fragmented and while Acrobat Reader reported 
that the file was corrupt and could not be opened, FTK was able 
to view the contents. The file was 2 MB in size and was 
substantially larger than all of the other recovered documents. It 
contained information such as text messages, phone book 
information, browser history, Facebook status updates, Google 
search history (Figure 9, right), YouTube videos visited, and 
music played from the SD card. It was difficult to look through 
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because it was so fragmented but searching the document made 
information easier to find. 
 
Recovered images 
 
 As on a typical computer, this Android device had 
nearly 13,000 images, only some of which would be interesting 
in a forensics examination. The first noteworthy images found 
were the ones displayed as the phone is booting up. There are 
three different images: the HTC logo, a Hero splash screen, and 
a Sprint screen. The HTC logo screen is displayed at two points 
in the booting process and features the HTC logo in a beveled 
silver text on a reflective black background. As the phone 
boots, the source of light in the image changes as it pans across 
the logo – this seems like a loading screen, indicating 
something is happening like a progress bar would. This logo 
was merely an animated GIF file. 
 The mtd3.dd file contained images for different 
applications. Backgrounds for a labyrinth style game; images 
for bookmarks, weather, alarm clocks, keyboards, and widgets; 
grids for Sudoku games; and icons for check boxes, contacts, 
camera, and navigation apps were found. 
 
 
Figure 10. Recovered images: Corrupted image file (left) and 
intact image file (right). 
 
 The mtd4.dd file contains contents of the Android 
cache. Recovered images from this location included some that 
were viewed from e-mail; some of the images were corrupted 
while others were perfectly intact (Figure 10). 
 Interestingly, only 30 images from the user's Gmail 
account were found. The highly fragmented condition of some 
of these images suggests that the amount of space allowed for 
caching of images viewed from Gmail is not large. 
Alternatively, it is possible that FTK was not able to locate or 
identify the images. 
 Another interesting result was that two of the images 
in the cache, although on the Gmail account, were never 
specifically called up or viewed on the phone. The best 
explanation is that they were preloaded from viewing the email, 
although the user never selected to download or view them. 
 The mtd5.dd file contains the user data and, not 
surprisingly, is where the majority of the recovered images 
were found. These were the types of pictures one would expect 
to find, namely images ranging from contact photos, downloads 
from browser Web pages, pictures taken with the Hero's camera 
and sent to someone via the Multimedia Messaging Service 
(MMS) or e-mail to those from applications such as Facebook, 
cover art from Pandora, image previews of videos from 
SprintTV and YouTube, and icons from applications. 
 
Searching 
 
 While browsing through images and documents 
yielded some helpful information, FTK was unable to locate 
text messages, e-mails, contacts, and call history. The search 
tool is quite powerful but in order to use it, an examiner needs 
to have an idea of what to search for. When trying to find 
emails, a logical starting point would be to search for the 
suspect's e-mail address. A search for j.lessard802@gmail.com, 
for example, yielded 1628 hits over 92 files. The files generally 
started with the e-mail address, followed by a preview of the 
body of the message and then the rest of the e-mail and 
recipient information. Many of the strings found looked like 
this one: 
 
j.lessard802@gmail.com >..ö7`à..ö7c$Ryan 
and Ysa I quite impressed with the talk they 
gave our class. Maybe impre....Ryan and 
Ysa<br><br>I quite impressed with the talk 
they gave our class. Maybe impressed isnt 
quite the right word for it - perhaps amazed 
they let everyone in to their life like that. I 
never really thought about the difficulty of 
communicating across cultures and how it 
would impact a relationship. Specifically if 
they didnt speak each others language. I 
guess the international language is truly 
dance.<br> 
 
 It is likely that if the suspect were using a mobile e-
mail client (such as a gmail application) would yield more 
messages than a system where only Web mail has been 
employed. 
 
 
Figure 11. User names and passwords found in plaintext, 
blacked out for publication. 
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 Hoog (2009b) has reported that the Android browser 
stores passwords in plaintext right next to a username and 
Uniform Resource Locator (URL). As expected, several of the 
search hits found the displayed username and password for 
several Web sites, one of which yielded a piece of a database 
that held all of the password information (Figure 11). This is 
very helpful for the forensic examiner although a poor security 
practice from the user perspective. While many people 
appropriately worry about saving their username and password 
information on their computers, and may even know how to 
hide those traces, most are likely less careful with similar data 
stored on their phone. 
 When searching for e-mail addresses, references were 
found to a file named contacts.db. After searching for that 
string, contact and phonebook information was found quite 
easily. It was located in a few different places and in pieces but 
that is likely due to the fact that FTK was unable to recognize 
the operating system and, before data carving, everything was 
just considered unallocated space. The actual path for the 
contacts appears to be 
/data/data/com.android.providers.contacts/
databases/contacts.db. 
 
Logical Examination 
 
 Although it is valuable to perform a physical 
examination to access deleted information that might otherwise 
go unnoticed, much of the data that was viewable in FTK was 
fragmented and difficult to read. Looking at files logically can 
show whole databases that are not fragmented. 
 
 
Figure 12. Contents of the /data/data directory. 
 
 Following the naming convention of the path where 
contacts.db was found, the Hero was hooked up again to 
the examination machine and the directory /data/data was 
inspected, and 154 subdirectories were found (Figure 12). 
 After the process of browsing each of these folders, 
listing the subdirectories and looking for databases, several 
valuable files were uncovered. As before, the files were copied 
to the SD card using the dd command (Figure 13): 
 
dd if=/data/data/subdir/databases/file.db 
of=/sdcard/file.db 
 
 
 
Figure 13. dd commands to create images of database (.db) 
files. 
 
 
Figure 14. Username and password of HTC Twitter user. 
 
 
Figure 15. Information about Twitter sites that the user follows. 
 
 The database files found by a logical examination of 
the Android device yielded a significant amount of interesting 
information. The first such file examined was /data/data 
/com.htc.htctwitter/databases/htcchrip.db, 
the database associated with htctwitter, the Twitter application 
called Peep, developed by HTC. This database file yielded 
account information (including an unencrypted password) 
(Figure 14) as well as account information for Twitter sites that 
the user follows (Figure 15). 
 In addition, 1460 Twitter updates were found, with 
detailed information about the sender. This output also contains 
a field named is_public, which defines whether the message 
was a private (0) or a normal tweet (1). 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Passwords found in plaintext. 
 
 
Figure 18. Data typed into browser forms. 
SMALL SCALE DIGITAL DEVICE FORENSICS JOURNAL VOL. 4, NO.1, SEPTEMBER 2010, ISSN# 1941-6164  8 
 
 
Figure 19. Browser history. 
 
 
Figure 20. Browser search history. 
 
 The database file 
/data/data/com.android.browser/databases 
/browser.db is a separate database for the Android browser. 
The contents of this file included usernames, URLs, and 
plaintext passwords (Figure 17), data typed into forms (Figure 
18), web browser history (Figure 19) and search history 
(although it was thought that this information had been deleted) 
(Figure 20). 
 Another interesting file is the 
/data/data/com.android.browser/gears 
/geolocation.db, which stores the last known location as 
reported by the GPS satelites (Figure 21). 
 
 
Figure 21. Last known geographic location. 
 
 The Google maps database can be found in 
/data/data/com.google.android 
.apps.maps/databases/search_history.db. This 
file contains the history saved for all searches entered into the 
Google maps application (Figure 22). 
 
 
Figure 22. Google maps database. 
 
 
Figure 23. Google apps account information. 
 
 The Google applications database is found in 
/data/data/com.google.android 
.googleapps/databases/accounts.db. This file 
contains Google apps account information, including the user 
name and the encrypted passwords (Figure 23). 
 
 
Figure 24. MMS/SMS message information. 
 
 The 
/data/data/com.android.providers.telephony
/databases/ directory contains information related to the 
messaging applications, including picture and text message 
data. The mmssms.db database contains the MMS and Short 
Message Service (SMS) messages [Address field truncated] 
(Figure 24). Note that the contents in this database included 
some deleted messages although no messages that were deleted 
more than 45 days prior were available. It is likely that the 
retained deleted messages would depend on the phone and 
individual user. 
 
 
Figure 25. Voice mail audio files. 
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Figure 26. Playback and analysis of voice mail audio files. 
 
 Voice mail audio files are not stored in a typical 
database file, but can be found in the 
/data/data/com.coremobility.app.vnotes/fil
es directory, using the file names VN-*.AMR (Figure 25). 
Adaptive Multi-Rate (AMR) files use a standard audio format 
that is commonly found in Global System for Mobile (GSM) 
communications cell phones (Figure 26). 
 
 
 
Figure 27. Telenav recent stops information. 
 
 Telenav is the Sprint navigation application. Files 
related to Telenav can be found in the 
/data/data/com.telenav.app.android.sprint/
files directory. The most useful file appears to be 
ANDROID_TN55_recent_stops.dat, which contains 
recent location information (Figure 27). When viewed 
logically, deleted history is not shown. 
 
 
Figure 28. Gmail database file. 
 
 
Figure 29. Complete e-mail. 
 
 The 
/data/data/com.google.android.providers.gm
ail/databases directory contains files related to Gmail, 
and contains information that is available when accessing 
Gmail via the application rather than via the browser. The 
mailstore.j.lessard @gmail.com.db file is the 
database for the user j.lessard@gmail.com, and includes e-mail 
history information such as sender, receiver, date received, 
subject, and a snippet of the message body (Figure 28). An 
example of the complete body of an e-mail can be found in 
Figure 29. 
 
 
Figure 29. Call history database, Number and name fields 
truncated for publication. 
 
 Android phones also contain extensive call history and 
contact information. The 
/data/data/com.android.providers.contacts/
databases/contacts.db database contains the call 
history, including the phone number, date, length of call in 
seconds, type of call (1 = incoming, 2 = outgoing, 3 = missed), 
and name from a phonebook look up, if available (Figure 29). 
 
 
Figure 30. Contact history information. 
 
 Other potentially useful  information in 
contacts.db includes contact names, number of times 
contacted, the time of the most recent contact, contact photo 
file (if used), custom ringtone (if used), and last time the 
contact information was updated (Figure 30). 
 
 
Figure 31. Facebook status updates. 
 
 Finally, the HTC Hero also synchronizes contact's 
Facebook status updates with the phone book. That information 
is also stored in contacts.db (Figure 31). 
 
Analysis With the CelleBrite 
 
 For comparison purposes, a CelleBrite Universal 
Forensic Extraction Device (UFED) was also employed to 
acquire information from the phone. The UFED is a stand-
alone hardware device that is designed to pull contact lists and 
address books, pictures, videos, music, ringtones, text 
messages, call history, and device identifying information. The 
UFED communicates with a cell phone via a data cable, 
infrared (IR), or BlueTooth (BT). Subscriber Information 
Module (SIM) data can be acquired directly from the card or 
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while in place in the phone. The UFED can acquire data 
logically or physically, although physical acquisition is not 
supported for the HTC Hero. The UFED acts as a write blocker 
so no information is written to the phone when conducting an 
examination (CelleBrite, 2010). 
 In order to connect the HTC Hero to the UFED, USB 
storage and USB debugging both need to be turned on. The 
UFED walks an examiner through the steps needed to logically 
acquire data; the examination output in this case was an HTML 
file directed to a USB thumb drive. 
 
 
Figure 32. Phone identifying information from the UFED. 
 
 
Figure 33. Some of the SMS messages extracted by the UFED 
[Phone numbers truncated for publication]. 
 
 
Figure 34. Some of the call history information extracted by the 
UFED; 
incoming calls (top), outgoing calls (middle), and missed calls 
(bottom). 
 
 The CelleBrite device starts its report with basic phone 
identifying information, such as the acquired device type, 
software level, mobile equipment identifier (MEID), and the 
data and time of the data acquisition (Figure 32). In this 
instance, the UFED recovered 1070 SMS messages (Figure 33), 
56 contacts, 107 incoming calls, 192 outgoing calls, 49 missed 
calls (Figure 34), 69 pictures, and one video. It was able to 
report on each category 100% correctly, as confirmed by 
examination of the phone itself. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 35. Two of the picture files extracted by the UFED. 
 
 
Figure 36. Video file extracted by the UFED. 
 
 The 69 pictures that were extracted from the phone 
came from shots taken by the phone's camera, screenshots of 
bookmarked Websites, and those received and downloaded as 
MMS messages. Two images are shown in Figure 35. Note that 
the EXIF information suggests that this phone may have taken 
the image at the top, while the picture at the bottom was not 
taken by this phone. Note also the different picture file naming 
format, further evidence that the files were created by different 
cameras. The one video that was found was taken with the 
camcorder feature in the Hero (Figure 36). 
 
Summary of Results 
 
 This experiment in acquiring information from an 
Android device using multiple methods is far from conclusive, 
although it provided some interesting insights: 
 
• dd analysis with FTK 
o Pros: Found deleted text messages and 
contacts that would have likely not been 
located utilizing another method, found 
passwords with relative ease. 
o Cons: Required root access, results extremely 
fragmented, countless hours would have to be 
spent to try to locate and piece everything 
together (although another forensic suite may 
have netted better handling of the file system 
and FTK easily could in the future with an 
update). 
 
• Logical analysis of specific databases 
o Pros: Recovered virtually everything that 
could be helpful to a mobile forensic 
investigation including call history, Web and 
search history, pictures, MMS/SMS 
messages, e-mail data with complete 
messages, and even GPS data, voice mail and 
passwords. 
o Cons: Required root access, did not find all 
deleted SMS messages, phone records, and 
contact info. 
 
SMALL SCALE DIGITAL DEVICE FORENSICS JOURNAL VOL. 4, NO.1, SEPTEMBER 2010, ISSN# 1941-6164  11 
• Data extraction with the CelleBrite UFED 
o Pros: Recovered MMS/SMS messages, call 
logs, photos, video, and contact information; 
simple, stand-alone method. 
o Cons: Logical extraction only (physical 
acquisition not yet supported); did not 
recover e-mails, browser, or search history. 
 
 It appears that browsing the databases logically netted 
the most information in an easily viewable way. Obtaining a dd 
image is extremely valuable but, aside from the user 
reconstructing where all the pieces fit, it was not the best 
method in this case. A different tool or forensics software with 
specific YAFFS2 support would make the physical analysis a 
winner. As it stands now, however, FTK would be most 
valuable when searching for very specific strings of text. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Cell phones are becoming even more sophisticated and 
able. Both law enforcement and the private sector need to 
invest time and money into learning about new operating 
systems and developing new forensic methods. 
 While Android forensics is still in its infancy, steps are 
being made to meet the new technology. CelleBrite (2010), 
Paraben (2008), and .XRY (Micro Systemation, 2008) all 
currently offer some type of Android solution and more tools 
will be adding support as Android gains in popularity. Android 
is not just for phones either; it can be used on computers, 
kitchen appliances, and military applications (Spencer, 2009). 
Expect to begin seeing it everywhere. 
 The number of Android phones will be continuously 
increasing as more manufactures adopt the budding OS. As it 
stands now, Android sales, by some estimates, will overtake 
iPhone sales within the next two to three years (Lomas, 2009). 
While Android is powerful, complex, has multiple firmware 
implementations and some with manufactures making custom 
UIs, the standardization will make mobile forensics simpler in 
the long run. Indeed, as the market for Android continues to 
grow, learning how to forensically acquire information from 
these devices becomes essential for mobile device examiners. 
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